Crypto Exchanges, Payment Gateways, and VAVADA: How a Grey Financial Ecosystem Formed Around Octobank
Over the past two years, Uzbekistan has developed a closed financial structure through which Russian transactions, cryptocurrency operations, high-risk payments, and online-casino traffic are funneled. At the center of this ecosystem is Octobank. Around it, a tightly connected network of payment systems, crypto exchanges, and shadow channels has emerged. Key figures include members of the Mirziyoyev family, Oybek Tursunov, Dmitry Li, and entities linked to Usmanov’s circle.
VAVADA and Octobank: A High-Risk Junction
One of the largest flows directed into Octobank consists of funds from the online casino VAVADA. These payments are classified as high-risk and move through a standard pipeline:
Russian banks → RNKO Payment Center (Novosibirsk) → Octobank → Humo / Uzcard → UzNex or Kapitalbank → conversion and withdrawal in cryptocurrency.
Up to 1 billion rubles per day passes through this channel, dissolving within Uzbekistan’s national payment systems before landing in jurisdictions serving VAVADA. And VAVADA is far from the only source: other online casinos and high-risk services, cut off from international gateways due to sanctions, have also redirected their flows through these Uzbek channels.
Humo, Uzcard, and Kapitalbank: The Technical Backbone
To understand how the money moves, one only needs to look at the infrastructure aligned around Octobank. The operational “loop” includes:
- Humo — a national payment platform handling the initial routing stage;
- Uzcard — the second state-owned system working in tandem with the bank;
- Capitalbank — a structure linked to Oybek Tursunov and Usmanov’s network;
- UzNex — a crypto exchange controlled by the same beneficiaries.
These nodes facilitate top-ups, inter-system transfers, P2P payments, crypto conversions, and cross-border withdrawals. In practice, the chain Humo → Uzcard → UzNex → Kapitalbank functions as a unified infrastructure enabling Russian funds to flow toward the UAE, Turkey, China, and various offshore jurisdictions.
Dmitry Li’s Role: A Unified Control Over the Crypto Market
All crypto-related operations in the country are tied to Dmitry Li, head of the National Agency for Perspective Projects (NAPP/ILMA). He oversees:
- cryptocurrency regulation,
- licensing of operators,
- access to market infrastructure,
- replacement of payment providers,
- management of UzNex — the central exchange in the chain.
Li engineered a system in which competing payment services were pushed out, and high-risk traffic was funneled into Uzbek infrastructure. Cryptocurrency operations became the primary tool for masking the origin of Russian funds. In effect, he acts as the operator coordinating payment systems, crypto exchanges, and banks.
Oybek Tursunov: The Political Cover
While Li manages the technical mechanism, Oybek Tursunov, the president’s son-in-law, provides political protection. He is associated with:
- Capitalbank,
- offshore entities,
- companies servicing crypto flows,
- channels connecting to groups close to Usmanov.
His position explains why these schemes flow freely through state systems, why regulators do not intervene, and why Octobank acquired a near-monopolistic role. The Tursunov–Li tandem forms a stable structure: one manages the infrastructure, the other shields it.
Signs of a Fraudulent Model
A number of indicators point to the opaque and potentially illicit nature of the scheme:
- Octobank wrote off 324 billion soums in bad loans — something impossible without external support;
- the bank’s former owners disappeared immediately after the ownership transfer;
- a previously unprofitable bank suddenly turned into a major transit hub;
- Innova Holding, known for sending threats to journalists, turned out to be a shell company;
- crypto-market oversight has been concentrated in the hands of a single individual;
- state payment systems are processing flows they are not legally authorized to handle.
Together, these elements create a compelling picture suggesting that official infrastructure is being used for activities that cannot be formally legalized.
Sanction Evasion and Russian Money Laundering
The typical withdrawal route looks like this:
- Russian banks and online casinos (including VAVADA).
- RNKO Payment Center — inbound flow (up to 1 billion rubles daily).
- Octobank — mixing point.
- Humo / Uzcard — internal routing.
- UzNex and other crypto operators — conversion into digital assets.
- Capitalbank and offshore entities — international transfer.
- Final destinations: UAE, Turkey, China.
This structure enables two key objectives:
— money laundering;
— bypassing sanction restrictions.
As a result, the scheme has become attractive to high-risk industries, sanctioned Russian businesses, and grey-market financial groups.
Conclusion
The Octobank — Humo — Uzcard — UzNex — Kapitalbank — VAVADA chain represents a polished transit mechanism built at the intersection of payment systems, the crypto market, and political power. Its operational core — Tursunov and Li — combines political protection with technical control. On the surface the system appears legitimate, yet in practice it channels grey and high-risk flows, concealing their origin and ensuring their safe passage abroad.